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INTRODUCTION
Though statistics clearly indicate “violent crime” in the
United States is declining1, the question of whether a crime is
considered “violent” for the purposes of the law is as prevalent as
ever.2 In 1984, Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act
(CCCA)3 in an effort to improve federal criminal laws.4 The Act

* J.D. candidate, May 2020, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; Dominican University, B.A. Criminology and B.A. Sociology, May
2017.
1
See https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/topicpages/violent-crime
2
See Id.
3
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Tit. II, 98
Stat. 1837 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections amongst U.S.C. titles
18, 21, 28, 29 and 34).
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imposed mandatory minimum sentences for offenders who committed
criminal offenses.5 Additionally, the CCCA increased penalties for
offenses considered to be violent crimes.6
Whether a defendant’s prior conviction qualifies as a crime of
violence is an important question of law that courts must decide.
Should a court find a crime of violence occurred, the question
becomes whether the defendant’s prior convictions should factor into
sentencing.7 The latter question is often left for the appellate courts to
resolve after a defendant appeals his or her sentencing, post-trial. In
such appeals, the defendant typically alleges that the district court’s
decision to enhance sentencing based on the defendant’s prior history
of violent crime was improper. However, there are some instances
when courts must decide such an issue before any proceedings begin,
including charges brought under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act
discussed in Section III of this comment.
Under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA),8 for example, the
court can increase the mandatory minimum sentence from ten to
fifteen years for federal defendants who have three prior convictions
for a crime that “has as an element thereof the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of another.”9
Problems for the courts appear in the vague nature of this definition.
Two common issues arise for courts when interpreting the statutory
language: 1) determining what constitutes “physical force,” as well as
to what degree of physical force must be used and 2) determining
whether a “crime of violence” includes crimes that are intentional or
accidental.10
4

HILLEL SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45220. THE FEDERAL “CRIME OF
VIOLENCE” DEFINITION: OVERVIEW AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS 1 (2018)
(HEREINAFTER “SMITH”).
5

Id.
Id.
7
The law contemplates both state and federal convictions.
8
Pub. L. No 98-473, Tit. II, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984).
9
United States v. D.D.B., 903 F.3d 684, 689 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 5032 (2012)).
10
See Smith, supra note 4.
6
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As for the first concern, most circuits, including the Seventh
Circuit, agree that “physical force” must be violent or destructive in
nature.11 Some courts, such as the Eleventh Circuit, have strayed from
this idea and concluded that there needs to be violent force to qualify a
crime as one of violence.12
Although courts can look to precedent as guides to their analysis,
individual states draft their criminal statutes differently, making it
difficult to apply one standard to all situations. Several landmark
Supreme Court decisions have clarified state statutes that are unclear
about whether certain crimes fall under a “crime of violence” category.
One such case is Johnson v. United States discussed later in this
comment. 13
Part I of this Comment explores various legislation requiring
the court’s analysis for “crimes of violence,” including the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act and the Armed Career Criminal
Act, as well as the Federal Sentencing Guidelines related to “Crimes
of Violence,” including case law invalidating some of the provisions
of these statutes; Part II of this comment explores how courts
approach the interpretation of Crimes of Violence and the recent
circuit and federal decisions that aid them in the process; Part III of
this comment discusses the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act and
implications for juveniles being transferred to adult proceedings based
on this statute in particular and the consequences in general; Part IV
of this Comment addresses how the Seventh Circuit’s decision in
United States v. D.D.B. is unique, changing the court’s analysis by
concluding that attempted robbery is not a crime of violence in

11

See Whyte v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 463, 468-69 (1st Cir. 2015); United States v.
Rede-Mendez, 680 F.3d 552, 558 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Haileselassie, 668 F.3d 1033, 1035 (8th Cir. 2012); Singh v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d
1228, 123334 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Benegas-Ornelas, 348 F.3d
1273, 1275 (10th Cir. 2003); Chrzanoski Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 188, 195-97 (2d
Cir. 2003); Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2003); United States
v. Landeros-Gonzales, 262 F.3d 424, 426-27 (5th Cir. 2001).
12
See Smith, supra note 4.
13
Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010).
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Indiana, paving a path for courts to use their discretion to keep
juveniles out of adult proceedings.

PART I – LEGISLATION HISTORY DEFINING “CRIMES
OF VIOLENCE”
A court’s decision to label crimes as “crimes of violence” is one
of discretion rather than statutory language. In fact, the specific term
“crime of violence” does not explicitly appear in statutes like the
ACCA or the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act.14 The Seventh Circuit
explained in United States v. Edwards that its use of the term “crime of
violence” is the language that courts have adopted in reference to the
statutory language guiding enhancement provisions based on prior
crimes.15 In Edwards, the court had to determine whether the
petitioner’s prior conviction in Wisconsin for burglary qualified as a
crime of violence.16 In doing so, the court provided a framework to
interpret whether a crime is a crime of violence.17 The court stated that
“if state law defines the offense more broadly than the [Federal
Sentencing] Guidelines, the prior conviction doesn’t qualify as a crime
of violence, even if the defendant’s conduct satisfies all of the
elements of the Guidelines offense.”18 This reasoning was echoed by
Justice Rovner in D.D.B.19
The foregoing indicates the importance of this issue. Regardless
of whether the alleged latest crime carries a lesser sentence, a court’s
determination that a defendant’s previous conviction was for a crime
of violence affects sentencing guidelines. Even if the defendant’s most
14

The specific language in both of those statutes is included in their respective
places in this comment.
15
836 F.3d 831, 834-35 (7th Cir. 2016) (referencing U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a)(2)(U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015)).
16
United States v. Edwards, 836 F. 3d 831, 836 (7th Cir. 2016).
17
See generally Id.
18
Id. at 833
19
United States v. D.D.B., 903 F.3d 684, 689 (7th Cir. 2018).
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recent crime carries a lesser sentence, if he or she were to be found
guilty, that determination could increase the defendant’s ultimate
sentence. The courts are not the only governmental body struggling
with the definitions of violent crime. In fact, with recent decisions
striking down statutory language, the issue of categorizing violent
crime is equally as challenging at the legislative level.
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984
The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 (CCCA)20 is one
of the most extensive reform legislations in modern American
history.21 Signed into law by President Ronald Reagan on October 12,
1984, the CCCA’s purpose was to clean up the crime problem in
society at the time.22 The more significant sections of the Act, amongst
others, covered regulation on issues such as bail reform, sentencing,
and the insanity defense.23 In a significant portion of the CCCA, the
legislature passed the Sentencing Reform Act24 intended to create a
uniform system of sentencing and to correct past leniency for serious
offenders.25 The Sentencing Reform Act established a U.S. Sentencing
Commission responsible for recommending and drafting sentencing
guidelines for federal judges.26 In an effort to increase accountability
in the judiciary, judges are required to explain why they strayed from

20

Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No 98-473, tit. II, 98
Stat. 1837 (1984).
21
See http://criminal-justice.iresearchnet.com/crime/school-violence/thecomprehensive-crime-control-act/
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as amended in
scattered section among U.S.C. titles 18 and 28).
25
See, generally, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1991), available at
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-andreports/mandatory-minimum-penalties/1991_Mand_Min_Report.pdf
26
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N ANN. REP. 137974 (1990).
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the guidelines if they choose to do so.27 After surviving a
constitutional challenge, the guidelines took effect in late 1989.28 As a
result, the commission also drafted new guidelines for mandatory
minimum sentencing provisions aimed at targeting drug and weapon
offenses, as well as recidivist offenders.29
Under the CCCA, codified under 18 U.S.C. § 16, a crime of
violence is defined as:
“(a) an offense that has an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person or
property of another, or
(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature,
involves a substantial risk that physical force against the
person or property of another may be used in the course of
committing the offense.”30

Armed Career Criminal Act
The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) was also enacted in
1984 as a deterrence effort to curb recidivism.31 The ACCA requires a
mandatory fifteen-year minimum prison sentence for felons who have
27

http://criminal-justice.iresearchnet.com/crime/school-violence/thecomprehensive-crime-control-act/
28
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1991), available at
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-andreports/mandatory-minimum-penalties/1991_Mand_Min_Report.pdf>; see also
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
29
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1991), available at
<https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-andreports/mandatory-minimum-penalties/1991_Mand_Min_Report.pdf>.
30
18 U.S.C. § 16 (a),(b).
31
Comment, Armed Career Criminal Act – Residual Clause – Johnson v.
United States, 129 HARV. L. REV. 301, 308 (2015) [hereinafter “ACA Comment”].
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three prior convictions for violent offenses or serious drug crimes
upon a conviction for an offense involving a firearm.32 The ACCA
provides, in relevant part:
“[T]he term ‘violent felony’ means any crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, or any act of
juvenile delinquency involving the use or carrying of a
firearm, knife, or destructive device that would be punishable
by imprisonment for such term if committed by an adult, that:
(i) has an element of the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person of another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another…”33
Specifically, the ACCA names burglary, arson, extortion, and
crimes involving explosives as violent felonies.34
In 2010, the Supreme Court in Johnson v. United States35
considered whether Florida’s felony battery offense constituted a
violent felony under the ACCA.36 Under this statute, a battery is
committed by “[a]ctually and intentionally touch[ing]” another
person.37 The Court had to determine whether that “has as an element
the use … of physical force against the person of another.”38 In order
to enhance Johnson’s sentence in the new offense, three of Johnson’s
five prior felony convictions would have had to be found to be

32

Id. at 309.
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B).
34
See ACA Comment, supra note 31.
35
See Johnson, supra note 13.
36
Id. at 135.
37
Id.
38
Id.
33

7

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2019

7

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 9

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 15

Fall 2019

“violent felonies.”39 At his sentencing, Johnson disputed his prior
battery conviction as a violent crime on the premise that battery in
Florida is typically a first-degree misdemeanor and the only reason it
was enhanced to a third-degree felony was because of his prior felony
record.40 Although Johnson urged the Court to rely on state precedent,
the court made it clear that the interpretation of state statutes is a
question of federal law, and not state law.41 Therefore, the Court
looked to federal precedent to determine if the state statute qualifies as
a violent crime.42 The Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion
and declined to categorize battery as a violent crime under the Florida
statute and sentencing paradigm because the action required in
Florida’s statute did not amount to “physical force” in the context of
“violent felony”.43
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Federal “Crime of Violence”
Definition
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines44 provide an extensive
roadmap of how judges should sentence defendants upon conviction.
Specific to crimes of violence, the guidelines require enhancements for
certain crimes that qualify under the definition for violent crimes.
Typically, the issue of whether a crime is violent is critical in the
sentencing stage of the case proceedings. The Guidelines define a
crime of violence as follows:

39

Id. at 136
Id.
41
Id. at 138.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 143-145
44
Hereinafter the “Guidelines.”
40

8
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(a) The term “crime of violence” means any offense under
federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year, that –
(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of
another or,
(2) is murder, voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping,
aggravated assault, a forcible sex offense, robbery, arson,
extortion, or the use or unlawful possession of a firearm
described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) or explosive material as
defined in 18 U.S.C. § 841(c).45
Courts examine three factors when determining whether a crime is
a crime of violence: (1) the underlying conduct of a criminal offense,
the statutory elements of the offense, or a combination of both to
determine whether the defendant’s prior conviction is for a crime of
violence; (2) degree of force necessary to satisfy the “physical force”
element in the statutory crime of violence definition and (3) examining
whether the crime requires a specific mental state.46 The court in
D.D.B., as analyzed further in Section IV of this comment, focused
strictly on the third prong of analysis as it explored whether the crime
of attempted robbery requires a specific mental state.47
The definition of a “crime of violence” lacked clarity, and in
2018, the Supreme Court addressed this issue.48 In Sessions v. Dimaya,
the Court settled the issue when it held that the residual clause of the
federal “crime of violence” definition was unconstitutionally vague.49
The residual clause of the statute is the portion under section 16(b)
45

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(A)(2) (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2015).
46
Smith, supra note 4, at 4.
47
United States v. D.D.B., 903 F.3d 684, 689 (7th Cir. 2018).
48
See Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018).
49
Id. at 1210.
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stating “any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature,
involves a substantial risk of physical injury.”50 The Court relied on its
analysis in Johnson to guide its ultimate ruling in Sessions, finding
that Justice Scalia’s reasoning in Johnson is precisely applicable in this
case.51
By diving into Johnson’s ruling, Justice Kagan explained how two
features of the residual clause rendered it unconstitutionally vague.52
First, the residual clause created “grave uncertainty about how to
estimate the risk posed by a crime” because it demanded that the judge
decide what “kind of conduct the ‘ordinary case’ of a crime
involves.”53 In fact, the ACCA lacked guidance for judges and left the
“ordinary case” up to subjective interpretation.54 Second, the residual
clause did not offer a clear “threshold level of risk [which] made any
given crime a ‘violent felony.’”55 In other words, the residual clause
demanded that the court apply the “serious potential risk” standard to
“an idealized ordinary case of the crime.”56 Essentially, the language
of the residual clause was too unpredictable to survive constitutional
scrutiny because of its “indeterminacy about how to measure the risk
posed by a crime with indeterminacy about how much risk it takes for
the crime to qualify as a violent felony.”57 By using a categorical
approach analysis, the Supreme Court held that under the 18 U.S.C. §
16, statute that defines “aggravated felonies” for immigration purposes
is unconstitutionally vague because it demands interpretation of an
ordinary-case requirement and a risk threshold, resulting in arbitrary
conclusions and does not give fair notice.58

50

Id. at 1211.
Id. at 1213.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 1214 (internal quotations in original).
54
Id.
55
Id. (quotations in original).
56
Id.
57
Id. (citing Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2552, 2558 (2005)).
58
Id. at 1223
51

10
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Although a legal definition of a violent crime does not seem
significant, the court’s decision about whether a crime is one “of
violence” has tremendous consequences for the defendant. For
example, in the immigration context under the Immigration and
Nationality Act, like in Sessions, “a non-U.S. national who commits a
‘crime of violence’ for which the term of imprisonment is at least one
year may face significant immigration consequences, including being
subject to removal from the country and thereafter rendered generally
ineligible for readmission.”59 Additionally, the consequences for
juvenile offenders are even more dire as discussed in Section IV.
PART II - JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO INTERPRETATION
In order to determine whether an offense is a crime of violence,
courts most often use the categorical approach.60 When using the
categorical approach, courts focus on the statutory definition of the
prior offense.61 The court must assess whether “the elements of the
offense are the type that would justify its inclusion . . . without
inquiring into the specific conduct of this particular offender.”62 When
interpreting state statutes, federal courts must determine whether the
state law defines the offense more broadly than the Guidelines. If so,
then the conviction cannot qualify as a crime of violence even if the
defendant’s conduct satisfies the Guidelines elements.63 When
utilizing this analysis, courts do not look to the facts that arose in the

59

See Smith, supra note 4 (quotations in original).
See United States v. Edwards, 836 F. 3d 831, 833 (7th Cir. 2016); see also
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1216 (2018).
61
See Id.
62
James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 202 (2007); see also Mathis v. United
States, 136 S.Ct. 2243 (2016).
63
See Edwards, 836 F.3d at 833 (quoting Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct.
2243, 2245 (2016)); (“’Elements’ are the constituent parts of a crime’s legal
definition, which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction;
they are distinct from ‘facts,’ which are mere real-world things – extraneous to the
crime’s legal requirements and thus ignored by the categorical approach.”)
60
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conviction, but only to the statutory elements of the offense.64 The
Supreme Court developed the categorical approach as a way to address
constitutional concerns that might arise if the court solely focuses on
the facts of the conviction.65 Specifically, the focus was to “avoid[ ]
the Sixth Amendment concerns that would arise from sentencing
courts’ making findings of fact that properly belong to juries.”66
Notably, there is a split in the Supreme Court about the use of the
categorical-approach in residual clause cases.67
However, when statutes include multiple modes of commission,
the courts use a modified categorical approach.68 Through this
approach, appellate courts are able to reference the convicting court’s
record, such as charging documents and plea agreements, to determine
which particular element of the offense the prior conviction at issue
was for.69 Under this approach, the court still does not take into
consideration the facts of the conviction.70
There is a third option – the underlying-conduct approach, which
the courts do not implement often.71 This approach allows courts to
64

Smith, supra note 4; see also Descamps v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2276

(2013).
65

Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1217 (2018).
Id.; see also Descamps, 133 S.Ct. at 267.
67
See Sessions, supra note 49, at 1216; but see Thomas dissent at 1242, “[I]f
the Court thinks that §16(b) is unconstitutionally vague because of the ‘categorical
approach,’ . . . then the Court should abandon that approach – not insist on reading
it into statutes and then strike them down.”); see also Thomas dissent at 1252,
“Instead of asking whether the ordinary case of an alien’s offense presents a
substantial risk of physical force, courts should ask whether the alien’s actual
underlying conduct presents a substantial risk of physical force.”
68
United States v. Taylor, 630 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Nijhawan v.
Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 41 (2009) (permitting a court to determine which statutory
phrase was the basis for the conviction by consulting the trial record).
69
See Id. at 633.
70
Id.; see also United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400, 405 (7th Cir. 2009)
(“[A]dditional materials . . . may be used only to determine which crime within a
statute the defendant committed, not how he committed that crime.”)
71
See Sessions, supra note 49, at 1216 (stating that §16(b) cannot be
interpreted by inquiring only into the elements of a crime) (Thomas J. Dissenting).
66
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consider the specific facts in which a defendant committed a crime.72
Justice Thomas discusses and favors this approach when analyzing
cases regarding the residual clause of statutes.73 This approach is most
controversial, however, due to constitutional concerns of reassessing
facts that were considered by the fact-finder.74 An instance where the
underlying-conduct approach is appropriate in the current pattern of
court interpretation is when a statute includes fact-specific language.75
PART III - JUVENILE IMPACT OF CURRENT “CRIME OF
VIOLENCE” ANALYSIS UNDER THE FEDERAL JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY ACT (§ 5032)
The government may obtain jurisdiction over juvenile offenders
and then petition to transfer juvenile cases to adult court if certain
elements of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (“FJDA”), codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (“section 5032”), are met.76 Under the FJDA, a
juvenile is “a person who has not attained his eighteenth birthday, or
for the purpose of proceedings and disposition under this chapter for
an alleged act of juvenile delinquency, a person who has not attained
his twenty-first birthday.77 On the other hand, “juvenile delinquency”
is “the violation of a law of the United States committed by a juvenile
which would have been a crime if committed by an adult…”78
72

Id.
Id. at 1256 (discussing the favorability of the underlying-conduct approach)
(Thomas J. dissenting).
74
Id. at 1216.
75
See United States. v. Rogers, 804 F.3d 1233, 1237 (7th Cir. 2015) (stating
that an exception under 42 § 16911(5)(C) uses fact-specific language and therefore
the court must use a conduct-based inquiry to determine whether the Petitioner’s
conduct qualified under consensual sexual conduct).
76
18 U.S.C. § 5032; but see United States v. Juvenile Male No. 1, 47 F.3d 68,
71 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Juvenile adjudication is presumed appropriate unless the
government establishes that prosecution as an adult is warranted.”).
77
Taylor Imperiale, Keeping Juvenile Conduct in Juvenile Court: Why the
Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act Does Not and Should Not Contain a Ratification
Exception, 2018 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 287, 289.
78
Id.
73
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Under section 5032, a juvenile is first protected against being
processed in federal court by prohibiting the government from
attaining jurisdiction over the juvenile entirely unless one of three
exceptions apply:
“(1) the juvenile court or other appropriate court of a State does
not have jurisdiction or refuses to assume jurisdiction over said
juvenile with respect to such alleged act of juvenile delinquency; (2)
the State does not have available programs and services adequate for
the needs of juveniles; or (3) the offense charged is a crime of violence
that is a felony…”79
Then, once the government attains jurisdiction of the juvenile, the
government may petition the court to transfer the juvenile to adult
court through either the mandatory provision or the discretionary
provision.80
Under the mandatory provision, the transfer of a juvenile to adult
court is mandatory if three conditions are met: (1) the juvenile
committed the offense after his sixteenth birthday; (2) the charged
offense is a felony that “has an element thereof the use, attempted use,
or threatened use of physical force against the person of another”; and
(3) the juvenile has previously been found guilty of a crime that “has
as an element thereof the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of another.”81 However, judges have
discretion to transfer a juvenile to adult proceedings if the juvenile
commits certain enumerated offenses, such as distribution of
controlled substances, after his or her fifteenth birthday.82 A basis for
79

18 U.S.C. § 5032.
See e.g., United States v. M.C.E., 232 F.3d 1252, 1255 (9th Cir. 2000).
81
18 U.S.C. § 5032; see also United States v. D.J.H, 179 F.Supp.3d 866, 874
(2016) (holding that carjacking satisfies the second requirement for mandatory
transfer under § 5032 because it has “an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force, and thus satisfies the second requirement for
mandatory transfer”).
82
18 U.S.C. § 5032; see also United States v. Juvenile Male No. 1, 47 F.3d 68,
69 (2d Cir. 1995).
80
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this kind of transfer can be satisfied if the prosecution can justify that
it is in the interest of justice.83 In order to make a determination
regarding whether the transfer would be in the interest of justice, the
court must consider and weigh factors included in the statute.84
Under the discretionary provision, the court can deny the
government’s motion to transfer the juvenile to adult court after
weighing all appropriate statutory factors under section 5032.85 A
transfer under this provision can be denied when, after weighing the
factors, the court determines that there is a more rehabilitative
approach that will be more helpful to the juvenile involved.86 For
example, in U.S. v. Juvenile Male No. 1, the district court reversed a
recommendation made by a magistrate judge and denied the
governments motion for transfer on the basis that the transfer would
not serve the interest of justice.87 According to the district court, the
juvenile had a variety of factors in his life that weighed in favor of
continuing juvenile proceedings. This allowed the juvenile to receive
proper rehabilitative treatment available through the juvenile
adjudication process that was not available if he were prosecuted as an

83

§ 381. Prosecution under youthful offender statutes – under federal law; see
also United States v. I.D.P., 102 F.3d 507 (11th Cir. 1996); see also 18 U.S.C. §
5032.
84
See 18 U.S.C § 5032. The statute considers “age and social background of
the juvenile; the nature of the alleged offense; the extent and nature of the juvenile’s
prior delinquency record; the juvenile’s present intellectual development and
psychological maturity; the nature of past treatment efforts and the juvenile’s
response to such efforts; [and] the availability of programs designed to treat the
juvenile’s behavioral problems. In considering the nature of the offense, as required
by this paragraph, the court shall consider the extent to which the juvenile played a
leadership role in an organization, or otherwise influenced other persons to take part
in criminal activities, involving the use or distribution of controlled substances or
firearms. Such a factor, if found to exist, shall weigh in favor of a transfer to adult
status, but the absence of this factor shall not preclude such a transfer.”
85
See United States v. Juvenile Male No. 1, 47 F.3d 68, 69 (2d Cir. 1995).
86
Id.
87
Id. at 70.
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adult.88 On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the district court did
not abuse its discretion is denying the government’s motion for the
juvenile’s transfer.89 In its conclusion, the Second Circuit enumerated
the spirit of the discretionary provision:
“Society has not assisted [I.R.] in alleviating the scars that
have marked his emotional and psychological development to
date. A strict law and order concept fails to recognize that the
poor choices I.R. has made reflect, in part, the limited
positive guidance in his development. Congress has provided
juvenile adjudication as an alternative to adult prosecution.
That reflects a hope that the disastrous effects of the
environment in which I.R. has grown can be reversed. In the
interests of justice, one last effort off the downward course of
life I.R. has followed is the more appropriate choice.”90
A juvenile’s transfer into adult court has tremendous
consequences for the delinquent as “nothing can be more critical to the
accused than determining whether there will be a guilt determining
process in an adult-type criminal trial … [I]f jurisdiction is waived to
the adult court, the accused may be incarcerated for much longer and
lose certain rights of his citizenship.”91 Annually, about 250,000
juveniles are prosecuted and sentenced in adult federal court.92 This
gives the courts reason to assess juvenile criminal history even more
carefully than for adults. Although there is precedent and courts
routinely examine what constitutes crimes of violence, there is no
indication that they have created a uniform standard, as demonstrated
88

Id. (district court stated that “I.R. was a ‘product of poverty,’ ‘[a]n angry
child [who] appears to have been simply allowed to walk away.’” Additionally, the
court noted the juvenile’s “’untapped learning ability’ and his ability to distinguish
right from wrong.”).
89
Id. at 71-72.
90
Id. at 70.
91
Imperiale, supra note 79.
92
Charles Curlett, and Lauren McLarney, Journey into Juvenile Justice,
FEDERAL LAWYER, 64 FEB FEDRLAW 10 (2017).
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by the Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in D.D.B., concluding that
attempted robbery under the Indiana statute is not a violent crime.93
PART IV - ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES V. D.D.B
The Seventh Circuit addressed a juvenile transfer request and thus
discussed whether a juvenile’s previous conviction for attempted
robbery is a violent crime under Indiana law in United States v.
D.D.B.94 In this case, D.D.B., a juvenile defendant, was charged with
the robbery of a pharmacy under the United States Criminal Code. The
United States petitioned the court to transfer D.D.B to adult court,
under 18 U.S.C. § 5032, claiming that the juvenile met the transfer
criteria for having a prior conviction for attempted robbery in
Indiana.95 The issue that the court had to decide was whether D.D.B.’s
prior conviction for attempted robbery in Indiana qualified as a violent
crime under the Indiana statute.96 Specifically, they had to determine
whether attempted robbery as drafted by the Indiana statute “has an
element thereof the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person of another.”97 Ultimately, in a unanimous
decision authored by Justice Rovner, the Seventh Circuit made a twopart holding: (1) that the juvenile defendant’s prior conviction for
attempted robbery did not qualify as a violent crime that could be used
to transfer D.D.B from juvenile to adult court under section 5032,
contrary to precedent; and (2) that the district court’s blanket rule that
any attempted violent felony is itself a violent felony in Indiana is in
error and thus any case with such a holding must be vacated and
remanded.98
It is important to examine the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in
precedential cases to understand why the court ruled as it did in

93

United States v. D.D.B., 903 F.3d 684, 693 (7th Cir. 2018).
See generally, Id.
95
Id. at 686.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 687.
98
Id. at 693
94

17

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2019

17

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 9

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 15

Fall 2019

D.D.B. that attempted robbery did not qualify as a violent crime.99
Using a categorical approach in their analysis, the court engaged in a
lengthy discussion about the element of intent.100 In that discussion,
the court revisited its prior decision in United States v. Duncan.101 In
United States v. Duncan, the Seventh Circuit had to decide whether a
robbery conviction under Indiana law qualified as a crime of violence
and could therefore satisfy the violent crime enhancement provision
under the ACCA.102 In Duncan, the defendant was sentenced to fifteen
years instead of ten because he had three prior convictions of robbery
in Indiana.103 The Seventh Circuit in Duncan had to determine what
the Indiana legislature meant when it included the language “putting
any person in fear” in its robbery statute.104 In order to do so, the Court
had to reference Indiana case law.105
First, the Court referenced United States v. Lewis, in which it had
reasoned that “because robbery ‘entails taking property from the
person of another by force or threat,’ it has as an element ‘the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.’”106 Even without
using actual force, “a robbery intrinsically involves ‘conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,’ making
it a crime of violence…”107 Second, the Court referenced Jones v.
State, an Indiana court decision which determined that robbery by fear
can be shown by circumstances that communicate an implicit threat to
use physical force, even if there is no explicit threat.108 Thus, in
Duncan, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court and held that
99

See United States v. Duncan, 833 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 2016); see Hill v.
United States, 877 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 2017).
100
United States v. D.D.B., 903 F.3d 684, 690 (7th Cir. 2018).
101
Id. at 689-690
102
Duncan, 833 F.3d at 752.
103
Id. at 753.
104
Id. at 752.
105
Id.
106
United States v. Lewis, 405 F.3d 511, 514 (7th Cir. 2005).
107
Id.
108
Jones v. State, 859 N.E.2d 1219 (Ind. App. 2007)
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robbery under Indiana law is a violent felony applicable to the
sentencing enhancement under the ACCA.109
Further, in D.D.B. the court discussed Hill v. United States, where
it held that “when a substantive offense would be a violent felony
under § 924(e) and similar statutes, an attempt to commit that offense
also is a violent felony.”110 Under this precedent, the Court in D.D.B.
could have ruled that attempted robbery is a crime of violence since
the court in Duncan determined that robbery under Indiana law is a
violent felony.111 However, Justice Rovner noted in the D.D.B. opinion
that the holding in Hill is “premised on the notion that ‘a conviction of
attempt requires proof of intent to commit all elements of the
completed crime.’”112 The reasoning in Hill relied on two premises –
the first, that “an element of attempted force operates the same as an
element of completed force,” and second, that “conviction of attempt
requires proof of intent to commit all elements of the completed
crime.”113 This was precisely Judge Hamilton’s point in the Morris v.
United States concurrence, reasoning that “[a]ttempt requires intent to
commit the completed crime plus a substantial step toward its
completion.”114
In 2018, the Supreme Court of the United States reached its own
conclusion about similar issues.115 The question in the controversial
Mathis v. United States was whether the Armed Career Criminal Act
creates an exception where a defendant can still have an enhanced
sentence if a conviction under a statute lists multiple, alternative
means of satisfying one or more of its elements.116 In its decision, the
109

United States v. Duncan, 833 F.3d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 2016).
Hill v. United States, 877 F.3d 717, 719 (7th Cir. 2016).
111
See Duncan, 833 F.3d at 758.
112
D.D.B., 903 F.3d at 690; Hill, 877 F.3d at 719; see also Morris
v. United States, 827 F.3d 696, 698-99 (7th Cir. 2016) (Hamilton, J.,
concurring).
113
D.D.B., 903 F.3d at 690.
114
Morris v. United States, 827 F.3d at 698 (Hamilton, J., Concurrence).
115
See Mathis v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 2243 (2016).
116
Id. at 2248.
110
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Supreme Court held that robbery is in fact not a violent crime under
Iowa statute and “a prior conviction does not qualify as the generic
form of a predicate violent felony” (the commonly understood version
of a crime) “if the element of the crime of conviction is broader than
an element of the generic offense.”117
Therefore, after implementing a categorical approach, the court in
D.D.B. ultimately held that the juvenile defendant’s prior conviction
for attempted robbery did not qualify as a violent crime that could be
used to transfer D.D.B from juvenile to adult court under section 5032
because Indiana’s attempt statute does not require the government to
prove intent.118 Because the statute does not require the government to
prove intent, no fact-finder during D.D.B.’s trial ever made a
determination that he had any intent to commit any of the elements of
robbery.119 Further, the Court held that the district court’s blanket rule
that any attempted violent felony is itself a violent felony in Indiana is
in error and thus any case with such a holding must be vacated and
remanded.120
The Court in D.D.B Lays a Foundation for Reform of the
Juvenile Delinquency Act Under Section 5032
Although the Seventh Circuit came to the correct decision in its
analysis by not categorizing attempted robbery as a violent crime for
purposes of a juvenile transfer order under section 5032, this could
have been an opportunity for the court to address the differences
between determining “crimes of violence” for purposes of juvenile
delinquency and “crimes of violence” for purposes of imposing
mandatory minimum sentencing under repeat offender statutes.
Although any individual facing a higher sentence under an
enhancement provision has a lot at stake in the court’s decision of

117

Id. at 2245.
D.D.B., 903 F.3d at 691.
119
Id. at 692.
120
Id. at 693.
118
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what constitutes a violent crime in a past conviction, it is detrimental
for juveniles who are still on the cusp of a higher rehabilitative age.121
In its analysis, as in all analysis concerning violent crime, the
Seventh Circuit relied on adult proceeding cases entirely, specifically
those used in mandatory minimum cases. In a way, the Seventh
Circuit’s analysis can be used as a guide to expand interpretation
approaches for other cases of similarly situated juveniles to avoid
transfer into adult proceedings. The court here could have instead
relied on more precedent cases in which a juvenile’s crime in
particular is being assessed on whether it should count as a crime of
violence. The problem with that is there is not much precedent where
the juvenile’s prior conviction is at issue.
In U.S. v. M.C.E., the Ninth Circuit was presented with whether
residential burglary is a crime of violence under Washington law,
which would qualify M.C.E. for mandatory transfer to adult court
under section 5032.122 The court used the categorical approach and did
not look to the facts of the case to see whether the conduct “resulted in
violence or a substantial risk of violence.”123 The compelling point in
this case is M.C.E.’s argument as to why residential burglary should
not be considered a violent crime.124 According to M.C.E., the Court
should “set aside the cases [finding residential burglary to be a crime
of violence] as irrelevant because they address the question in the
context of federal sentence-enhancement statutes unrelated to the
juvenile transfer provision at issue here.”125
In response, the Ninth Circuit stated that the difference in purpose
is not relevant and can only serve as a distinction.126 In its holding, the
court qualified residential burglary as a crime of violence “because of
their conclusions about the nature of residential burglary itself, not
121

Imperiale, supra note 79, at 301.

122

United States v. M.C.E., 232 F.3d 1252, 1253 (9th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1255.
124
Id. at 1256.
125
Id.
126
Id.
123
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because of the particularities of federal sentencing statutes.”127 The
court stated that “[w]hether residential burglary is a crime that creates
a substantial risk of violence turns on the dangers inherent in the
commission of residential burglary, not on whether that question is
considered in the context of sentencing under the Armed Career
Criminals Act or transfer to adult status under §5032.”128 In general,
the court should have considered juvenile convictions in the first place
(even if through the transfer statute). It is nonsensical to treat juveniles
the same as recidivist convicted adult criminals.
First, courts should expand their approaches when handling prior
convictions for juveniles in transfer decisions. Although the
categorical, or modified categorical approaches, are mechanical and
logical methods for determining predicate offenses, they limit the
court’s ability to consider facts of the case when utilizing them. Courts
may reference the trial record and charging documents when applying
the modified categorical approach, but in a juvenile transfer situation
the court should develop an analysis that does consider the facts in
order to give the juvenile a substantially greater chance at not being
tried as an adult. For instance, by implementing the underlyingconduct approach, the court would have discretion about whether the
facts of the case can keep the juvenile out of adult proceedings. For
instance, section 5032 of the FJDA states:
“In considering the nature of the offense, as required by this
paragraph, the court shall consider the extent to which the
juvenile played a leadership role in an organization, or
otherwise influenced other persons to take part in criminal
activities, involving the use or distribution of controlled
substances or firearms. Such a factor, if found to exist, shall
weigh in favor of a transfer to adult status, but the absence of
this factor shall not preclude such a transfer.”129

127

Id.
Id.
129
18 U.S.C. § 5032.
128

22

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol15/iss1/9

22

Derkacz: The Anatomy of Violent Crime: How Judicial Analysis for “Crimes o

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 15

Fall 2019

Under the discretionary provision, those are some of the factors
the court must consider and weigh when deciding if transfer is
appropriate to serve the interests of justice.130 All of those factors are
fact-based and if the court is to consider the facts of the particular
situation when determining whether the juvenile should be transferred
to adult court, then it should follow the same analysis when
considering the past offense and whether it is violent. Above all, the
criminal law is meant to rehabilitate offenders and juveniles even more
so, as young people are more capable of rehabilitation.131 However,
despite their acknowledgement that juvenile conduct “is not as morally
reprehensible as that of an adult,” courts continue to apply the same
standard of analysis as they do in repeat adult offender situations.132
Neurological research has shown that juvenile offenders do not
possess the same requisite mens rea culpability to reach the threshold
of adult convictions and should thus not be presented with the level of
sentencing that comes with it.133 Unfortunately, the clear consequence
of being transferred into adult proceedings means receiving adult
sentences. The FJDA aims to hold juveniles accountable for adult
conduct appropriately, as it should. However, an alternative to
transferring juveniles to adult court should at least be an option when
the facts of the conduct illustrate the juvenile’s ability to rehabilitate.
On the other hand, the Court’s refusal in D.D.B. to look to the
facts of his prior conviction in order to do a thorough analysis of
whether he had intent to commit a robbery served to his advantage as
he was ultimately not transferred to adult court.134
Courts also argue that the transfer statute does not increase
punishment for juveniles, per se, but only establishes jurisdiction over
130

See 18 U.S.C. § 5032
Imperiale, supra note 79, at 301.
132
Id.
133
Id., at 303.
134
D.D.B., 903 F.3d at 692. (“Intent is not an element and so a conviction by
itself does not establish that the defendant had intent. He could simply knowingly
take a substantial step toward the taking of property through force or fear. One
would have to look behind the conviction to the underlying facts to know if he had
the intent to commit the crime, and this we cannot do.”)
131
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the juvenile.135 Although that is the case in the transfer juvenile cases,
once a juvenile is in fact transferred to adult court, they face the same
consequences and sentencing as adult defendants – taking away
jurisdiction from juvenile adjudication and rehabilitative resources
designed for juveniles.
CONCLUSION
Under section 5032, courts have significant discretion on whether
to transfer juveniles to adult proceedings. Considering the lifelong
consequences that such a transfer can have on juveniles, courts should
do everything in their power not to transfer them unless dire
circumstances warrant such a transfer. It can be further argued that one
juvenile conviction of a violent crime in a juvenile’s criminal history,
such as attempted robbery, should not be grounds to transfer if the
facts surrounding the attempted robbery, analyzed through an
underlying-conduct approach, indicate that the juvenile has potential
for rehabilitation and did not play a leadership role in the attempted
robbery. Therefore, although the Seventh Circuit in D.D.B. was correct
in it its approach when analyzing whether attempted robbery was
considered a violent crime under Indiana Statute in this specific
instance, it could have considered expanding their analysis to an
underlying-conduct approach.

135

See United States v. Juvenile, 228 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2000).
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